Report, 3 and as recently as four years ago Andrew Ashworth noted that the 'conflict of principle' had still to be resolved. 4 The Court of Appeal's current position is that manslaughter can be established by a reasonably foreseeable risk of some bodily harm in the circumstances known to the defendant, 5 through the commission of an advertent criminal act, 6 which (legally) caused death. For the appellate court, legislative intervention was the recommended way forward. 7 In this article, I hope to establish moral and historical authority for two separate kinds of unlawful act manslaughter. I will argue that the current, amalgamated, crime is illogical: liability may be established on the basis of a death that is neither intended nor foreseen, nor even capable of being foreseen by the individual concerned. With a view to separating out the possible justifications for two kinds of unlawful act manslaughter, I
will establish some historical authority for both means of proof, before considering the possible justifications for each. The conclusion will suggest that manslaughter by 2 G. Williams, 'Constructive Manslaughter' [1957] Crim LR 293 at 301. 3 H. M. Commissioners on Criminal Law, Fourth Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law (1839) xxviii: 'It may be very questionable whether, in point of principle, an effect wholly unexpected and unconnected with the intention and act of the party, except by accident, can properly be made the foundation of criminal responsibility; for as the object of punishment is the prevention of crime, it ought properly to be annexed to such acts as are in themselves culpable by reason of their mischievous tendency, and the intention with which they are done, and not to such as are simply accidental and unintentional.' Italics added. 4 Above n. 1 at 337. 5 R. v JF and another [2015] EWCA Crim 351, [2015] All ER (D) 117 (Mar). Cf. D. P. P. v Newbury and Jones [1977] AC 500 (HL). 6 The Court of Appeal indicated that the mental element for the crime was sufficient, not necessary, suggesting that the unlawful conduct need only be committed voluntarily and that, as a possible result, no crime is established without the death which is consequently caused. Cf. R. v Andrews an act of intended bodily harm may be justifiable, but that this may be possible where death is caused through any advertent crime.
More thoughts about the integrity of unlawful act manslaughter
The Law Commission's recommendation was that '"criminal act manslaughter"'
should be defined as 'killing another person (a) through the commission of a criminal act intended by the defendant to cause injury, or (b) through the commission of a criminal act that the defendant was aware involved a serious risk of causing some Horder's proportionality principle as 'vague', it was suggested that this proportionality might equate to one step up in a ladder of offences against the person, so that, for example, an intended act of grievous bodily harm was sufficient justification for liability with regards to consequently causing death. 36 This meant that the label murder, but not manslaughter, 37 could be justified in these terms.
The change of normative position implied by intentionally attacking another was approached quite differently by John Gardner. For him, the advertent commission of a crime provides notice of impending liability for its unforeseen consequences. This means that the defendant has an opportunity to avoid liability for homicide by avoiding the commission of a crime, the dangerous circumstances of which cause death. Gardner was clear that an advertent crime, which includes recklessness or intention in its definition, is a more efficient means of putting the defendant on notice of liability for unforeseen consequences which flow from the commission of that crime. 38 Morally speaking, the 'killing' was put forward as the 'basic wrong', but the rule of law was said to change the defendant's normative position through the unlawful act. 39 As Ashworth noted, however, 'fair warning of an unfair rule does not turn it into a fair rule.' 40 For him, the defendant should be able to choose whether to risk liability for homicide, and this choice should be based on a foreseen, or at least a foreseeable, risk of death; this is an element of the correspondence principle. 41 Gardner explained that changing one's normative position was not meant as a justification of the law, only as a means of understanding it.
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One of Ashworth's suggested means of justifying liability in these circumstances was the harm which is objectively risked. 43 Mitchell argued that although the degree of risk could not readily be calculated in all circumstances, the risk of death from a punch might be said to be 'strictly' foreseeable. 44 This was, however, an alternative justification from the change of normative position. It does not tell us why a defendant should be held liable for homicide on the basis of an intended act of violent crime; instead it suggests that an objective risk of death is enough. This is a possible justification for manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act, but not manslaughter by an act of intended bodily harm.
Ashworth determined that the real justification for the change of normative position was, therefore, the intention to attack another's person, and that the proportionality principle merely acted as a limitation on the extent of liability for the could have become aware of by paying more attention is a possible substitute, but it is by no means a perfect substitute. It leaves more to chance in the warning that the law gives to the defendant of her impending violation.' 39 J. Gardner, Offences Clearly, some violent crimes are committed by an intoxicated offender.
Manslaughter by an act of intended bodily harm would require a "specific" intent, which means that the offender's intent would have to be proven, even if intoxicated, for a manslaughter conviction to follow. 63 We will see how the doctrine of prior fault affects manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act. is actual bodily harm, from a single blow, or a sufficient combination of blows, or a push apparently designed to cause actual bodily harm, there is an argument that death is a logically foreseeable result, whatever the circumstances, inasmuch as bodily harm is a part of killing.
Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act
If an offender causes death in the commission of an unlawful act, which does not involve an act of intended bodily harm, there is no justification for the attribution of liability for manslaughter unless death was foreseen or foreseeable. The degree of foreseeable harm, through the circumstances of the unlawful and dangerous act, becomes critical to this kind of unlawful act manslaughter's moral and legal justification. Further requirements, which will be explained, include the capacity to foresee the risk in terms of age and mental capacity, a likely degree of risk and the opportunity to avoid causing it.
Victor Tadros suggested that if the crime 'creates a risk of death, even a small risk, there is good reason to see the imposition of that risk as wrongful.' 66 While
Mitchell saw the unlawful context as less important than the degree of risk involved, his view ultimately relies on 'a recognisable (albeit unlikely) risk of death'. 67 Buxton had criticised the current law, as established in Church, 68 on the grounds that the 'irrelevant unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct is used to justify the imposition of liability for even a slight degree of negligence.'
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Without the justificatory force of an act of intended bodily harm, there are no grounds for extending liability beyond those consequences foreseen or foreseeable; the degree of harm that is or should be contemplated ought to be the death caused. This is supported, in part, by the correspondence principle, which involves the degree of harm caused equating to that intended or risked and Tadros has noted that this may apply to both advertent and inadvertent risk-taking. 70 It might be argued that the objective nature of dangerousness-that the risk is foreseeable to a bystander from the circumstances of the crime 71 -is a reasonable one, provided that it recognises the capacity of the defendant to foresee what the bystander would have foreseen. The law, however, has resolutely refused to follow the path laid down for it almost fifty years ago by HLA Hart, for whom:
those whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the normal capacities, physical and mental, for doing what the law requires and abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair opportunity to exercise these capacities. 72 Punishment for this kind of risk-taking can act as a deterrent even if the sanction cannot act as a guide at the moment of deliberation, but instead 'causes him to exert his faculties' in 'the knowledge that others are punished'. 73 The opportunity to take account of the defendants' age and mental competency, in the objective test of dangerousness, was declined in JF and NE. 74 The Court of Appeal's position is difficult in the light of various recommendations for reform, but the test can hold a defendant liable for failing to reach a standard that s/he is incapable of attaining. 83 The view that probable risk should be necessary was supported by jurists including Holmes on the basis of an opportunity to avoid causing harm, 84 and by necessary to suggest to the offender the risk of which s/he should have been aware. 86 Hale's earlier view of the law. 100 Austin, whose lectures were known of in the 1830s, 101 but whose influence on jurisprudence was not fully felt until his work was posthumously published, 102 described the difference between negligence and heedlessness in these terms:
The states of mind which are styled "Negligence" and "Heedlessness," are precisely alike. In either case, the party is inadvertent. In the first case, he
does not an act which he was bound to do, because he adverts not to it. In the second case, he does an act from which he was bound to forbear, because he adverts not to certain of its probable consequences. Absence of a thought which one's duty would naturally suggest, is the main ingredient in each of the complex notions which are styled "negligence" and "heedlessness." 103 Clark also distinguished between negligence and heedlessness, arguing that negligence 'in its proper sense, is confined to non-act.' 104 Unlike negligence, heedlessness relates only to probable risk and not to the conduct involved. There is no standard of conduct from which to depart, because the unlawful and dangerous act should not have been committed at all. 105 Negligence can involve the failure to take a different opportunity in relation to the foreseeable risk. "Gross" negligence comprises a failure to take straightforward precautions, which would have been taken by the reasonable person. In this way, gross negligence manslaughter may be the result of failing to minimise a foreseeable risk that has already been created.
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Contrast this with heedlessness, which involves the creation of a foreseeable risk. By comparison with dangerousness, heedlessness meant that the unlawful act should not have been committed at all, because the act could be dangerous in the circumstances. The opportunity to avoid the creation of risk existed before the unlawful and dangerous act was committed and not as a result of dangerous circumstances arising during the unlawful act's commission. Its justification came from dangerous circumstances and not simply from the commission of the unlawful act. Russell noted that the heedless act causing death was unlawful (and manslaughter) because it 'was likely to breed danger' in the circumstances.
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Foster, on the other hand, seemed to believe that there should be an unlawful act and heedlessness. These views, taken together, focus attention on the dangerous circumstances of the unlawful act and, therefore, the opportunity to avoid them.
Dangerousness is also an objective test but, by way of contrast, can involve the foreseeable risk arising during the commission of the crime, rather than before. It has been widened to include all of the circumstances surrounding the crime, 108 but does not always allow the defendant to avoid creating the risk. The significant issue, with regards to heedlessness, is that those circumstances known to the bystander allow the defendant 'to exercise the capacity to advert to' the foreseeable risk and to avoid it. 111 There may be circumstances in which the foreseeable risk arises during the performance of the unlawful act, but cannot be avoided. The bystander should also be aware of all those circumstances which the defendant is aware of in committing the crime, including those which are known beforehand. enquiry into capacity and opportunity necessitated by negligence liability widens the time-frame of the criminal law, giving precedence to the doctrine of prior fault over the principle of contemporaneity. 120 In terms of prior fault, the defendant who has killed in the course of an unlawful act can only really be said to have 'made oneself a "time-bomb"', 121 as Chris Clarkson suggested, 122 if there was the capacity to foresee and the opportunity to avoid the creation of the risk. The doctrine is important, therefore, in recognising that a failure to recognise an obvious risk need not arise at the same time as the unlawful act that causes death: the opportunity to foresee and avoid the dangerous circumstances may appear before the unlawful act has been committed; the heedless risk-taking and the unlawful act need not be seen as contemporaneous.
Anthony Kenny noted that the 'threat of punishment for negligence is meant to enforce at all times a standard of care'. 123 This, of course, can only be done if there is prospective notice of the potential duty and this is where the law is 'at its retrospective worst'. 124 In the case of heedlessness the threat of punishment would enforce a standard of foresight in the commission of an advertent crime, so that individuals exert their faculties with regards to dangerous circumstances created by committing that crime.
The need for a distinction between negligence and heedlessness is illustrated by applying both to the facts of Bristow. 125 The duty of care required for gross negligence manslaughter and its breach might have been established: manoeuvring vehicles at night in a confined space could have exposed the householder to a reasonably foreseeable and serious risk of death. 126 But the idea that unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter cases can be dealt with under gross negligence manslaughter has been doubted. 127 The creation of risk was foreseeable before the unlawful act was committed and there was, therefore, the opportunity to avoid it by avoiding the unlawful act. By carrying on the defendants had been heedless.
Negligence suggests that the risk has been created through taking insufficient care before or during an activity. Heedlessness suggests that the risk has been created by the activity. The opportunities to minimise the risk or to avoid creating it are different.
Reconstructing unlawful act manslaughter
The law as it stands is an amalgam of two different kinds of unlawful act manslaughter. Without the justificatory force of an act of intended bodily harm, the correspondence principle tells us that liability for death is appropriate only where death is intended or foreseen, 128 or at least foreseeable. 129 Even Ashworth, who argued that an intended act of actual bodily harm that causes death should not be labelled as a homicide offence, 130 acknowledges that liability for negligently causing death may be justified 'subject to certain conditions (for example an incapacity exception, and suitable rule-of-law protections such as due notice).' 131 In the light of the Court of Appeal's view, that these issues should once again be referred to the Law Commission, 132 the time has come to recognise the separate justifications involved in manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act, as compared with an act of intended bodily harm. In the absence of these hoped-for reforms, the courts have shown themselves to be capable of reaching the appropriate degree of harm in gross negligence manslaughter. 133 It may be that the most that can be achieved through legislation is the sought-after capacity exception, which has been compared to the impact that section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 had on the presumption of intended consequences. 134 There It is, however, arguable that even in the context of such an exception, advertent risk-taking is more culpable than heedlessness. But can it really be said that: 'actions which, for all one knows, may be dangerous are less dangerous than actions which one positively knows to be a risk'? 138 Actions which, for all one knows, may create risks are arguably more prevalent, if less culpable, because they are more difficult to avoid than advertent creation of risk. The advertent risk-taker has not avoided taking the risk, but surely inadvertent risk-taking is no less prevalent. 139 There is historical authority for unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter and manslaughter by an act of intended bodily harm. The moral authority for the latter may reside in the law's respect for physical integrity or an attitude towards luck. But it must not be forgotten that they were and could be separate means of proving manslaughter with separate justifications. Unlawful act manslaughter might be justified, at least in part, by the opportunity to avoid the creation of the foreseeable risk.
This would involve a different approach from the most recent recommendation of the Law Commission. 140 There are grounds for unlawful act manslaughter where the likely risk of death, from the commission of an unlawful act in the circumstances, can be foreseen and avoided by an individual of the same age as the defendant, provided that s/he is mentally/physically able and that s/he is put on notice of the required standard of foresight, through the commission of an advertent crime. If it is felt necessary to limit the scope of unlawful act manslaughter to crimes of violence, actual bodily harm is an appropriate degree of harm provided that it is intended.
Fifty years ago, in his 'classic' article, 141 Buxton argued that 'there is perhaps something to be said for making the degree of hazard required rather less severe when it is intentionally as opposed to negligently caused.' 142 That 'something' is arguably pursuit, which is an attitude of dependency on luck, displayed by an act of intended bodily harm.
